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Abstract
A method is presented for constructing replicated services that retain their availability and
integrity despite several servers and clients being corrupted by an intruder, in addition to others
failing benignly. More precisely, a service is replicated by n servers in such a way that a correct
client will accept a correct server's response if, for some prespecified parameter k, at least k
servers are correct and fewer than k servers are corrupt. The issue of maintaining causality
among client requests is also addressed. A security breach resulting from an intruder's ability to
effect a violation of causality in the sequence of requests processed by the service is illustrated.
An approach to counter this problem is proposed that requires fewer than k servers to be corrupt
and that is live if at least k + b servers are correct, where b is the assumed maximum total number
of corrupt servers in any system run. An important and novel feature of these schemes is that
the client need not be able to identify or authenticate even a single server. Instead, the client is
required only to possess at most two public keys for the service. The practicality of these schemes
is illustrated through a discussion of several issues pertinent to their implementation and use, and
their intended role in a secure version of the Isis system is also described.
"This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DoD) under DARPA/NASA sub-
contract NAG2-593 administered by the NASA Ames Research Center, by grants from GTE, IBM, and Siemens, Inc.,
and by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. Any opinions, conclusions or recommendations expressed
in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies or decisions of the National
Science Foundation or the Department of Defense.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are often structured in terms of clients and services. A service exports a set of
commands, which clients invoke by issuing requests to the service. After executing a command, the
service may return an appropriate response to the client that invoked the command. In the simplest
case, the service is implemented by only one server. If this server is not sufficiently immune to failure,
however, then the service must be replicated.
In hostile environments, replication introduces other problems. For instance, it is often more
difficult, or at least requires more resources, to protect many servers from corruption by an intruder
than it is to protect only a single server. A replicated service should thus be designed to remain
available and correct despite several servers being corrupted by an intruder (in addition to others
failing benignly). One way to do this employs the state machine approach [25] to replicating the
service, so that each server individually computes the response and sends it to the client. If the
client authenticates the response from each server and accepts the response, if any, sent by a majority
of servers, then it obtains the correct response if a majority of servers are correct. Such schemes,
however, require that the client be able to identify and authenticate the servers that comprise the
service. This may be difficult if the set of servers can change over time or if there is no trustworthy
source from which the client can obtain the identities and authentication information of the servers.
In this paper we propose a combined solution to these problems using the state machine ap-
proach. The service is implemented by n servers in such a way that for some prespecified parameter
k, a correct client accepts a response from the service provided that at least k servers are correct.
Moreover, if fewer than k servers are corrupt, any response accepted at a correct client is guaranteed
to have been computed by a correct server. An important feature of this scheme is that the client
possesses exactly one public key for the service (as opposed to, e.g., one for each server) and can
treat the service as a single object for the purposes of authentication. This enhances application
modularity and significantly simplifies the service interface for clients. We emphasize that the client
need not know the identity of even a single server to authenticate the response of the service.
Even in a system with fewer than k corrupt servers, at least k correct servers, and the above
guarantees, correct clients may accept improper responses from the service if an intruder has caused
the correct servers to process improper requests or to process requests in an incorrect order. In this
paper we also discuss this issue. We focus on an attack in which an intruder effects and exploits a
violation of causality in the sequence of requests processed by the service. (While similar to an attack
described in [22], this attack is more severe because it involves corrupt servers.) We also propose a
way to avoid this attack that requires that the client possess at most one additional public key for
the service and that fewer than k servers be corrupt. And, this solution is live if at least k + b servers
are correct, where b is the assumed maximum total number of corruptions suffered by servers in any
system run.
The above discussion may be evocative of the large body of literature that provides solutions to
various distributed computing problems in models where Byzantine failures can occur but authen-
tication is possible (see, e.g., [19]). Nevertheless, our work has a somewhat different emphasis: we
employ novel cryptographic techniques to achieve the aforementioned results, and one contribution of
our work is the demonstration of the practical value of these techniques. Our approach thus stands in
contrast to the body of literature just described, which typically assumes only a conventional digital
signature scheme.
While we have not yet implemented the protocols described in this paper, we intend to use them
in a secure version of the Isis distributed programming toolkit [22]. (See appendix B.) The Isis system
provides process group and reliable group multicast abstractions that facilitate the construction of
high-performance, fault-tolerant applications [1, 2]. Several services that will be provided in the
secure version of Isis, including a secure name service and a secure public key authentication service,
could be implemented using the techniques described here. And, these techniques may be a useful
tool to support for application programmers. We devote one section of this paper to a discussion
of several practical issues that arise in such an implementation and use of our protocols, as well as
ways to optimize our methods in practice.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we give a brief overview of
the state machine approach to replication; for more detail, the reader should see [25]. In section 3
we enumerate our assumptions about the system. In section 4 we present a method of implementing
services that provides the availability and integrity guarantees outlined above. In section 5, we
discuss the importance of maintaining causality among client requests and a method to counter an
intruder's attempts to exploit violations of causality. Section 6 discusses several issues pertinent to
the implementation of our protocols. We outline related work in section 7 and conclude in section 8.
2 State machine replication
A state machine consists of a set of state variables and exports a set of (possibly parameterized)
commands. The state variables encode the state of the state machine, and the commands transform
that state. A client of the state machine invokes a command by issuing a request to the state
machine. Each command is implemented by a deterministic program and is executed atomically
with respect to other commands. Commands should be executed by a state machine in an order
that is consistent with Lamport's causality relation [18]. That is, two requests from the same client
should be processed in the order they were issued, and if one request could have caused another from
a different client, then a state machine receiving both should process the former first. Execution of
each request results in some response (i.e., output), which we assume is returned to the client that
issued the request. Responses of a state machine are completely determined by its initial state and
the sequence of requests it processes.
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State machine replication is a general method of implementing a fault-tolerant service by si-
multaneously employing many state machine servers and coordinating client interactions with them.
If all servers are initialized to the same state, and if all correct servers process the same sequence
of requests, then all correct servers will give the same response to any given request. By prop-
erly combining the responses of the servers, where "properly" depends on the type of failures being
considered, the response of the fault-tolerant service is obtained.
3 The system model
Our system consists of a set of pi'incipals, n of which are servers and the remainder of which are
clients. All principals communicate exclusively via a network of arbitrary topology. A principal is
correct in a run of the system if it always satisfies its specification. A principal may fail in an arbitrary
manner, limited only by the (conjectured) properties of the cryptosystems and signature schemes we
employ. Our failure model is thus most similar to "Byzantine with message authentication."
In order to capture the notions of an "accidental" failure versus a purposeful corruption by
an intruder, we partition the faulty principals into two sets: the honest principals and the corrupt
principals. Formally, the only property that this partitioning must have is that any principal that
ever suffers "truly Byzantine" failures--i.e., failures that cannot be classified as fail-stop, crash,
omission, or timing failures [4J--must be classified as corrupt. In a given system run, we let corrupt
and correct (in slanted font) denote the numbers of corrupt and correct servers, respectively. We
assume that there exist known constants t and b such that b < t < n and in any system run,
corrupt <_ b and correct > n - t. That is, in any system run at most t servers fail, and of these at
most b are "malicious."
Although principals fail as a single unit, it is convenient to view each principal as consisting of
logically separate modules. (See figure 1.) More precisely, each server consists of a communication
module, a coordination module, and an application module. The communication module is closest to
the network, the application module is furthest, and the coordination module lies in between. The
application module of a server is simply a state machine as described in section 2. The coordination
module delivers a request (c, m), from client c and with contents m, to that state machine by calling
deliver( {c, m}), which places (c, rn) at the end of a list of requests to be processed that is available
to be read by the state machine. We assume that calls to deliver are made strictly sequentially, in
the sense that a call to deliver is not made until all previous calls to deliver have returned. Using
the primitives supplied by the communication module, the coordination module also implements a
respond primitive respond(c, m) by which the state machine can send a response m to a client c.
The communication module implements two communication primitives for use by the coordina-
tion module. The first is a send primitive send(c, m) by which the coordination module can send
a message to a client; this is presumably used in the implementation of respond(c, m) and will not
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be used further in this paper. The second is an atomic broadcast primitive abcast(m) by which the
coordination module of a server s can broadcast a message (s, m) to the set of servers. A server's
communication module receives a message (s,m), from server s and with contents m, by calling
receive( (s, m)), which places (s, m) at the end of a list of received messages that is available to be
read by the coordination module. Messages are received only from servers, according to an atomic
broadcast protocol 7_ that satisfies the following specification.
Receipt Atomicity: A message is either received at all correct servers exactly once or is never
received at any correct server.
Receipt Validity: A correct server receives a message from a correct or honest server s only if s
previously broadcast that message. Moreover, if a correct server broadcasts a message, it will
eventually be received at all correct servers.
Receipt Order:. A correct server receives message (s, m) before another message (s', m') iff all correct
servers do. That is, all correct servers receive the same sequence of messages.
Receipt Consistency: The sequence of messages received by an honest server is a prefix of the
sequence of messages received by a correct server. 1
Options for implementing atomic broadcast are discussed in section 6; here we simply note that
there already exist protocols in the literature that satisfy this specification in various models and for
lit is shown in [13] that even in a synchronous system, any atomic broadcast protocol that is tolerant of omission
failures and that guarantees consistency with respect to faulty principals requires a majority of correct principals.
Thus, if honest is defined to include those servers that suffer omission failures, the results of this paper require n > 2t.
various definitions of honest. Our protocols do not rely upon any bounds on message transmission
times or the execution speeds of principals, and so the only such bounds required for our results, if
any, are those required by the particular atomic broadcast protocol used.
A client consists of only two modules, an application module and a communication module. The
application module of a client c is some client program that can issue a request (c, m I to the service
by calling request(m). The communication module of the client implements this primitive, e.g., by
signing and broadcasting (c, m) to the entire network. Assuming that each request from a correct
client eventually reaches some correct server, iservers can easily implement an atomic broadcast pro-
tocol for client requests by, e.g., forwarding requests to the other servers via abcast and determining
the delivery order of requests by their order of receipt at correct servers. That is, we assume that
servers also implement a protocol, called D, that satisfies the following properties.
Delivery Atomicity: A request is either delivered at all correct servers exactly once or is never
delivered at any correct server.
Delivery Validity: A correct server delivers a request from a correct or honest client c only if c
previously issued that request. Moreover, if a correct client issues a request, it will eventually
be delivered at all correct servers.
Delivery Order:. A correct server delivers a request (c, m) before another request <c', m') iff all
correct servers do. That is, all correct servers deliver the same sequence of requests.
Delivery Consistency: The sequence of requests delivered by an honest server is a prefix of the
sequence of requests delivered by a correct server.
Assuming that each server is initialized to the same state, these properties imply that all correct
and honest servers will produce the same response (or no response) to a given request. The commu-
nication module of a client accepts a response m for the application module by calling accept(m).
4 Preserving integrity and availability
Recall from section 1 that our first goal is a service that satisfies the following properties, for some
prespecified k.
Integrity: If corrupt < k, then the response accepted at a correct client, if arty, is that computed
by a correct server.
Availability: If correct > k, then a correct client will accept a response from the service.
We satisfy these requirements by replacing the respond(c, m) and accept(m) routines of servers
and clients, respectively, with two new routines, respond_(e, m) and accept'(m), that will ensure these
properties. Therefore, the new structures of principals will be as pictured in figure 2. Although we
have replaced the respond routine with respond _ at the interface provided to the application module
of each server, we assume that respond is stiU available for execution by the coordination module.
Similarly, we assume that accept is still available to the communication module of each client.
Figure 2: New structure of principals
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Threshold signature schemes
The respond' routines at the different servers will employ a (k, rt)-threshold signature scheme. A
(k, n)-threshold signature scheme is, informally, a method of generating a public key and n shares
of the corresponding private key in such a way that for any message m, each share can be used to
produce a partial result from m, where any k of these partial results can be combined into a signature
for m that can be verified with the public key. Moreover, knowledge of k shares should be necessary
to sign m, in the sense that without the private key it should be computationally infeasible to (i)
create a signature for m without k partial results for m, (ii) compute a partial result for m without
the corresponding share, or (iii) compute a share or the private key without k other shares.
Cryptanalytic attacks against threshold signature schemes differ from those against their con-
ventional counterparts in that the cryptanalyst may possess some number of shares and be able
to acquire partial results, in addition to message/signature pairs. For our purposes, we will say,
informally, that a (k, n)-threshold signature scheme is secure if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Possession of only k- 1 or fewer shares and of partial results for various messages does not
facilitate signing new messages. That is, if a possessor of such information can sign a new
message, then it could also sign that message without knowledge of any shares or partial
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results for any messages. This property, which is formalized in [11], says that the threshold
signature scheme is as secure as the conventional signature scheme on which it is built.
, The conventional signature scheme on which the threshold signature scheme is built prevents
selective forgery under known signature attacks. That is, a cryptanalyst cannot manage to
sign messages of its choice even though it can see signatures corresponding to various other
messages (but not corresponding to messages of its choice, as would be possible in a chosen
message attack).
This definition is in accordance with the security of all implementations of threshold signature
schemes thus far proposed, in the sense that all proposed implementations are based upon con-
ventional signature schemes that are known to be vulnerable to chosen message attacks.
Our respond _ routine is not dependent upon any particular implementation of a (k, n)-threshold
signature scheme, although for concreteness we outline the necessary details of an implementation
proposed in [7]. The scheme begins with an RSA [24] public key (e, N) and private key d, where N
is the product of two safe primes and the Carmichsel function )_ is used in place of Euler's totient
function ¢ to create e from d. That is, ed -: 1 mod A(N), where A(N) is the smallest positive integer
such that x _(y) --- 1 rood N for all x E Z_v. The n shares {K_}l<_<_n are generated from d in such a
way that for any set T C_{1,..., n} of size k, _ieT(K_. Pi,T) = d- 1 rood A(N), where the integers
{Pi,T}_eT are fixed a priori and public. 2 So, by defining the i-th partial result for a message m to be
am,i - m g_ mod N, it follows that for any T C_{1,..., n} of size k, Am,T =--rn'l'IiET(am,i) p''r mod N
is the proper ltSA signature m d rood N for m. 3 Variations of this scheme have been proved to be
as secure as RSA, in the sense of property 1 above [11].
The protocol
Suppose that a public key (e,N) and corresponding shares {K_}l<i<,_ are created as above and
distributed so that for all i, 1 < i < n, server s_ is the sole possessor of Ki and any principal can
reliably obtain (e, N), the public key of the service. We do not discuss methods for distributing this
information, although we note that all public key systems require similar steps. The (information
for computing the) integers PI,T for all i and T can be "hardwired" into the implementation of the
servers. Then, the respondt(c, m) and acceptS(m) routines are implemented as follows.
2Each of the _ntegers p,,r for all i and T can be computed from a fixed set of n integers, each of binary length
O(log n) (if so chosen), with O(n) integer multiplications and additions.
_For reasons of security and efficiency, it is advisable that a message digest of the message be signed, as opposed to
the message itself [5].
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Routinerespondr(c,m) at servers_:
1. Execute abcast(am,i).
2. Wait to receive a set {am,j}jeT, ITI = k, of partial results for m such that Am,T is a valid
signature for m.
3. Execute respond(c, (rn, Am,T)).
Routine acceptr(m) at client c:
1. If m is not of the form (m r, S), then return to the calling routine.
2. If 5' is a valid signature for m r and mtis a valid response (i.e., is of the right form), then
execute accept(mr). 4
Claim 1 If the threshold signature scheme is secure, then this protocol satisfies Integrity.
Proof. Because each correct and honest server produces partial results only for responses that it
computes, the assumptions that corrupt < k and that the threshold signature scheme is secure imply
that the corrupt servers can generate signatures only for responses computed by a correct server
(and possibly for other, presumably useless, messages). So, the corrupt servers can neither directly
generate an improper response that a client will accept nor create signatures for arbitrary messages
of their choice in order to perform chosen message attacks against the signature scheme. Therefore,
any response that is accepted by a correct client must have been computed by a correct server. []
Claim 2 This protocol satisfies Availability.
Proof. Suppose that correct >. k. By Receipt Validity of _, all correct servers eventually receive
partial results from k correct servers, and so each correct server can compute a proper signature on
its response. []
Discussion
In terms of communication complexity, in a failure-free run the replacement of respond with respond r
results in an additional n executions of T_ (i.e., abcast), which can be executed concurrently. There-
fore, the entire protocol that begins when a client issues a reques t and ends when it accepts a response
consists of three communication "phases" that must be executed roughly sequentially: the request
by the client (one execution of D), the dissemination of partial results (n executions of 7"£), and the
sending of the responses (n executions of respond). This protocol can be optimized in at least two
ways, first by noticing that a client needs to receive only one correctly signed response for Avail-
ability to be satisfied. This implies that only min{t + 1, n - k + 1} servers need to be designated
4Here we have omitted consideration of several forms of attack, such as replay attacks [26].
to respond to any given request. In addition, the partial results for the signature of the response
need to be broadcast only to that set of servers. The set of servers designated to respond to a given
request can be fixed in advance or determined dynamically. A second optimization is for servers
to communicate partial results by a reliable broadcast protocol, obtained by removing the Receipt
Order requirement and replacing "sequence" and "prefix" with "set" and "subset," respectively, in
the Receipt Consistency requirement of atomic broadcast. Since reliable broadcast is weaker, it can
be implemented at least as efficiently. Reliable broadcast can be used because the order in which
partial results are received by servers is not important in this protocol.
In theory, the most computationally expensive part of the protocol is step 2 of the respond'
routine, in which the server sorts through the partial results it receives until it finds a T of size k
such that Am.r is a valid signature. The server must examine at most only the first h = min{n, k+b}
partial results received (from h unique servers), and at most (_) subsets of partial results, because in
h partial results are at least k correct partial results (if correct > k). While this could be expensive if
h is large and k _ h/2, the expected search time should be small in the common case in most systems,
i.e., when n and corrupt are small. 5 A minor optimization is to have a server always include its own
index in T when computing Am,r, and heuristics, such as using partial results from a combination
of servers that previously worked, could also be used to reduce the search time in practice. Further
optimizations, one of which is discussed in appendix A, are a topic of ongoing research. However, we
emphasize that in most systems, the search time for a valid signature will probably be dominated
by other costs and should not be a limiting factor in the performance of our protocols. Accordingly,
we view further optimizations of this search to be primarily of theoretical interest.
In this scheme, each server must know O(n log n) bits of pubLic information (in order to compute
the p_.T'S; see footnote 2), in addition to the public key for the service and its share of the private
key. Each client needs to know only the public key of the service.
5 Preserving input causality
One guarantee provided in the previous section is that if corrupt < k, then the response accepted at a
correct client will be the response computed by a correct server. Even the output of a correct server,
though, may not reflect the way things "should be" if an intruder has caused the service to deliver
improper requests or to deliver requests in an incorrect order. In general, ensuring proper responses
from a correct server requires access control, because responses computed from state variables that
can be written (directly or indirectly) by corrupt clients cannot be trusted. Access control is an
entire research area in itself and will not be discussed further here.
SFor example, in typical Isis applications, a service might be implemented by three to five servers, but rarely more.
For such services this search would be insignificant.
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In this sectionweaddressthe issueof ensuringthat requestsaredeliveredin a correctorder by
correctservers.Becauseweassumeanatomicbroadcastprotocol2) to disseminateclient requests,
weconcernourselvesonly with the requirementthat correctserversdeliver requestsin an order
consistent with causality (see section 2). A common method of preserving causality among client
requests is for each client to refrain from sending any messages between the time it issues a request
to the service and the time at which the request is delivered at some honest or correct server [25].
Consider the case, however, in which a correct client issues a request to the service, and after receiving
the request, a corrupt server sends a message to a corrupt client. If the corrupt client subsequently
issues a request, then there is a causal relationship between the two requests. However, it is not clear
how this relationship can be detected by correct servers.
To illustrate why this may be important, we borrow an example from [22]: suppose that the
service of interest is a trading service that trades stocks and that a client issues a request to purchase
shares of stock through this service. After discovering the intended purchase, a corrupt server could
collude with a corrupt client as described above to issue a request for the same stock to the service.
If the correct servers deliver this request before that of the correct client, this request may adjust the
apparent demand for the stock and raise the price offered to the correct client. Thus, by allowing
the causally subsequent request of the corrupt client to be delivered before the request of the correct
client, a type of "insider trading" may occur. Moreover, access controls alone cannot naturally avoid
this problem, as the intent is that any client can request to purchase stock at any time.
In the remainder of this section, we present new request and delivery routines, respectively
denoted request'(m) and deliver'((c, m)), that replace request(m) and deliver( (c, ml). Therefore, if
used with the respond _ and accept _ routines of section 4, principals would be structured as in figure
3. These new routines protect correct clients from the type of attack described above, in the sense
that any request based on information obtained from a correct client's request (c, m) can be delivered
at correct servers only after (c, m/. As before, we will use deliver in our implementation of deliver _,
and similarly for request and request'.
In the implementation of requestl(m), the correct client c encrypts m under a public encryption
key of the service before issuing (c,m/. Then, c is provided the following guarantee. The reader
should verify that this guarantee prevents the aforementioned problem, provided that corrupt < k. 6
(This k can be chosen independently of that in section 4.)
Causality: If corrupt < k, then if some request is (i) issued after m is decrypted anywhere (other
than c), and (ii) delivered at a correct server, then that request is delivered at all correct servers
after (c, m/.
In addition to satisfying Causality, request' and deliver _ must also ensure that client requests are
delivered according to the specification of atomic broadcast--i.e., that Delivery Atomicity, Delivery
6We do not consider traffic analysis attacks [26] or attacks that exploit the malleability of the cryptosystem [8].
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Validity, Delivery Order, and Delivery Consistency still hold. The implementations of request _ and
deliver _ that we propose satisfy all but the second half of Delivery Validity with no further assump-
tions; to ensure that a correct client's request will eventually be delivered at all correct servers, we
require correct > k + b.
Threshold cryptosystems
Our deliver' routines at the different servers will employ a (k, n)-threshold cryptosystem. A (k, n)-
threshold cryptosystem is, informally, a method of generating a public key and n shares of the
corresponding private key in such a way that for any message m encrypted under the public key,
each share can be used to produce a partial result from the ciphertext of m, where any k of these
partial results can be combined to decrypt m. Moreover, knowledge of k shares should be necessary
to decrypt m, in the sense that without the private key it should be computationally infeasible
to (i) decrypt m without k partial results for m, (ii) compute a partial result for m without the
corresponding share, or (iii) compute a share or the private key without k other shares.
As with threshold signature schemes, cryptanalytic attacks against threshold cryptosystems
differ from those against conventional public key cryptosystems in that they may involve the use
of partial results and some number of shares, in addition to plaintext/ciphertext pairs. For our
purposes, we will say, informally, that a (k, n)-threshold cryptosystem is secure if it satisfies the
following properties:
1. Possession of only k - 1 or fewer shares and of partial results for various ciphertexts does not
facilitate decrypting new ciphertexts. That is, if a possessor of such information can decrypt
12
oa new ciphertext, then it could also decrypt that ciphertext without knowledge of any shares
or partial results for any ciphertexts. This property, which is formalized in [11], says that the
threshold cryptosystem is as secure as the conventional cryptosystem on which it is built.
The conventional cryptosystem on which the threshold cryptosystem is built is resistant to
known plaintezt attacks. That is, the cryptanalyst cannot manage to decrypt given cipher-
texts even though it can see the plaintext corresponding to various other ciphertexts (but not
corresponding to ciphertexts of its choice, as would be possible in a chosen ciphertezt attack).
This definition is in accordance with the security of all implementations of threshold cryptosystems
thus far proposed, in the sense that all proposed implementations are based upon conventional
cryptosystems that are known to be vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks.
Because the acts of signing a message and decrypting a message are operationally identical in
the RSA signature scheme and cryptosystem, one implementation of a (k, n)-threshold cryptosystem
can be obtained directly from the (k, n)-threshold signature scheme described in section 4. Messages
would be encrypted under the public key (e, N) of the service in the usual manner, and the i-th
partial result for an encrypted message m -- (mr) e mod N would be defined precisely as in section
4--i.e., am,i -_ mg' mod N. Then, m' -- Am,T _ m • [IieT(a,n,i) p_,r for any T of size k. Other
implementations of threshold cryptosystems have been proposed, based upon both the RSA and
E1Gamal [9] cryptosystems [6, 16].
The protocol
Suppose that we are using the RSA threshold cryptosystem described above and that we have the
initial conditions assumed in section 4; i.e., server s_ is secretly given sole possession of K,, any
principal can reliably obtain the public key (e, N) of the service, and all servers know (a priori) Pi,T
for all i and T. The basic idea of our protocol is that each client c encrypts the contents m of its
request with the public key of the service, in an attempt to force k servers to cooperate to decrypt it.
Then, each correct or honest server refrains from broadcasting its partial result for (the ciphertext
of) m until the delivery sequence through (c, m) is fixed locally. In this way, if corrupt < k, then
once a corrupt server collects k partial results for m, the sequence of requests through (c,m) has
been fixed at some, and thus all, correct servers, and no requests can be placed before (c, m) in the
delivery sequence at correct servers.
This protocol preserves Causality iff each server requires k partial results for m to decrypt m.
Even under the assumption that this cryptosystem is secure, however, this unfortunately is not the
case with this or any proposed implementation of a (k,n)-threshold cryptosystem. The problem
is that our protocol as described above allows a corrupt server to mount chosen ciphertext attacks,
against which neither the RSA nor the E1Gamal cryptosystem (nor any threshold cryptosystem based
upon them) is resistant. In our setting, a corrupt server can see at any time how any ciphertext m of
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itschoosing isdecrypted,by simply requestingthat a corrupt clientc issue(c,m) as an apparently
legitimaterequest to the service.The corrupt servercan then collectk partialresultsform to see
the plaintextto which m decrypts.
Methods of using chosen ciphertextattacksagainstthe RSA and EIGamaJ cryptosystems are
well-known. Here we illustrateone method, originallydue to Moore (see[5]),by which a corrupt
servercan decrypt the RSA ciphertextm - (m_)e rood N in a correctclient'srequest(c,m) without
waitingto receivek partialresultsfor m.
I, The corrupt serverchooses an arbitraryx and computes y -=xe mod N; i.e.,x - yd mod N. 7
2. Via a corruptclient,the corruptserverissuesa requestwith contentsyrn rood N tothe service.
3. The corrupt servercollectsk partialresultsforyrn rood N and forms (yra)d mod N.
4. The corrupt servercomputes x-I _--v-d mod N, and then
x-l(ym)d = y-dydmd __ m d _ (rn,)ed _ m' mod N.
(NB: If x does not have an inverse mod N, then the corrupt server can factor N because
gcd(x, N) is a prime factor of N.)
Similar attacks are possible with the threshold cryptosystems described in [6, 16].
Ideally, we would like to find a threshold cryptosystem based on a conventional public key
cryptosystem that is tolerant of chosen ciphertext attacks. As already mentioned, however, no such
threshold cryptosystem has been proposed, and even conventional public key cryptosystems that are
tolerant of such attacks (e.g., [8]) are highly impractical. Therefore, such attacks must be prevented.
A simple way to do this is to have each client use a separate public encryption key for the service.
That is, the public key for the l-th client c_ would be a pair (et, Nl), and each server si would be
given a share Ki,t for use when cooperating to decrypt a request from client ct. This prevents chosen
ciphertext attacks against the keys and ciphertexts of correct clients, because any request received
from a corrupt client will be decrypted using the shares of the key for that client, and not a correct
one. The practical ramifications of this design, as well as ways to improve it in practice, are discussed
in section 6.
The one remaining problem in our protocol is that corrupt servers can provide incorrect partiai
results that may disrupt the decryption process. Therefore, it must be possible for a server to
determine when it has properly decrypted a request. To facilitate this, clients are required to send
7The obvious form of this attack, in which x - y - 1 mod N, could easily be made unproductive for the corrupt
server: if each correct client signs the contents of its reqt_est before encrypting it and each correct server delivers a
request on behalf of the client whose signature appears on the decrypted contents (and not necessarily the client that
issued the request), then by issuing a request containing m, the corrupt server only expedites the delivery of the correct
client's request.
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with eachrequesta message digest of the request. Message digests have the property that the message
digest of a given message can be computed efficiently, but it is computationally infeasible to produce
two messages having the same message digest or to produce any message having a prespecified
target message digest. Accordingly, we henceforth assume that the included message digest uniquely
identifies, but does not disclose, the contents of the encrypted message, and that the joint use of
message digests and the threshold cryptosystem does not reveal information that a cryptanalyst
could use to circumvent the properties of either one. The validity of this assumption obviously
depends on the chosen implementation of message digests. We also note that if the message digest
function ...... a .......is injective, message digest does, in fact, uniquely identify a meSsage, s Several efficient
implementations of message digest functions have been proposed (e.g., [23]) but will not be discussed
here. Let digest(m) denote the message digest of m.
Then, the request I and deliver I routines execute as follows.
Routine request'(m) at client ct:
1. Create the RSA ciphertext m' =- m e_ mod Nt and message digest D = digest(m) of m.
2. Execute request( (m', D) ).
Routine deliver'((et, m)) at server si:
1. If m is not of the form (m J, D), then return to the calling routine.
2. Execute abcast(a,n,,i), where am,,i = (m') K''_ mod NI.
3. Wait until the first k + b partial results {am',j}jeT, IT[ = k + b, for m I have been received
(from k + b unique servers).
4. Search for a subset T _ C T of size k such that digest(A,n,,T,) = D. If such a T' exists and
Am',T' is a valid request, then execute deliver((cl, Am,,T,)).
Claim 3 This protocol satisfies Delivery Atomicity, Delivery Order, and Delivery Consistency.
Proof. (Delivery Atomicity) By Delivery Atomicity of D, for each client request deliver r is either
called exactly once at all correct servers or never called at any correct server. Clearly a request of the
latter type is never delivered at any correct server, and so now consider a request (c, m), m = (m _, D),
of the former type. If only fewer than k + b partial results for m _ are received at correct servers, then
the request will never be delivered at any correct server. So, suppose that k + b partial results for m _
are received at all correct servers. By Receipt Order of 7_, all correct servers employ precisely the
same set {a,_,j}jer, IT[ = k + b, of partial results when attempting to decrypt m _. Therefore, one
'One such implementation employs a deterministic public key cryptosystem: the digest for a message is computed
by encrypting the message under an a priori, commonly known public key, for which the corresponding private key has
been destroyed and is not known.
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correct server delivers some request iff all correct servers do, and all correct servers deliver the same
request, assuming that D uniquely identifies a single request.
(Delivery Order) By Delivery Order of D, all correct servers execute the same sequence of deliver'
calls. And, because any call to deliver' returns before deliver I is called again, it follows from the
argument for Delivery Atomicity that all correct servers execute the same sequence of deliver calls.
(Delivery Consistency) By Delivery Consistency of'D, the sequence of deliver' ca_s at an honest
server is a prefix of the sequence of deliver _ calls at a correct server. Moreover, because the sequence
of messages received at an honest server is a prefix of the sequence of messages received at a correct
server (by Receipt Consistency of 7_), if the honest server receives sufficiently many messages, it will
use the same set {arn'j}jET, ITI = k + b, of partial results to decrypt each request as the correct
servers do. Thus, the sequence of requests delivered at an honest server will be a prefix of the
sequence of requests delivered at a correct server. []
Claim 4 A correct server delivers a request from a correct or honest client c only if c previously
issued that request. (That is, the first half of Delivery Validity holds.)
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that, by Delivery Validity of D, if c is correct or
honest, then deliver'((c, m)) is called at a correct server only if c issued the request (c, m). []
Claim 5 If correct > k + b, then if a correct client issues a request, it will be delivered at all correct
servers. (That is, if correct > k + b, then the second half of Delivery Validity holds.)
Proof. If correct >_ k + b, then for each call to deliver' at correct servers, at least k + b partial results
are broadcast by and, therefore, received at all correct servers. So, at a correct server, each call to
deliver' eventually returns; i.e., the service makes progress. This, together with Delivery Validity of
D, implies that for any request (c, m}, m = (m', D), issued by a correct client c, deliver'((c, ml)is
eventually executed at all correct servers. Since the k + b partial results used to decrypt m' contain
at least k partial results from correct and honest servers, m' can be decrypted and delivered. []
From the above claims, we immediately have the following.
Claim 6 This protocol satisfies the specification of atomic broadcast (for client requests) whenever
correct > k + b.
We now prove that the above protocol satisfies Causality.
Claim 7 If the threshold cryptosystem is secure, then this protocol satisfies Causality.
Proof. Suppose that the threshold cryptosystem is secure and corrupt < k. Then, the earliest point
at which the ciphertext m' in a request (c, m/, m = (m _, D 1, from a correct client c can be decrypted
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anywhereis sometimeafter somecorrector honest server broadcasts its partial result for m'. Let
s be the first correct or honest server to broadcast its partial result for m'. By Delivery Order and
Delivery Consistency of :P, all correct servers eventually execute (possibly an extension of) the same
sequence of deliver' calls that s executes. Therefore, all correct servers will execute deliver'( (c, m))
before deliver'((_, fit)) for any (_', fit) issued after m' was decrypted. If all correct servers deliver (the
plaintext corresponding to) m', then Causality is satisfied. Moreover, because c is correct, the only
way in which m' could not be delivered at all correct servers is if the correct servers never receive k + b
partial results for m'. In this case, the deliver'( (c, m)) call at each correct server will never return,
and no more requests will be delivered at any correct server, thus trivially satisfying Causality. []
Discussion
In a failure-free run, the replacement of deliver with deliver' results in an additional n executions of
R. (i.e., abcast), which can be executed concurrently. Thus, when this protocol is used to disseminate
client requests and the protocol of section 4 is used to sign responses, the total message complexity
is 2n -t- 1 broadcasts (n of which can be reliable only; see section 4) plus the number of responses,
structured in four communication phases. It is worth noting that if, e.g., the same value for k is
chosen for both protocols, then Availability can be guaranteed only if correct > k + b, and so the
number of servers designated to respond to each request should be reduced to min {t + 1, n- (k + b) + 1}.
As in the protocol of section 4, step 4 of deliver' is potentially expensive, because it may require
a server to sort through (k+b) subsets of partial results to be able to decrypt a request. In fact, a
corrupt client can force each server to sort through (k+b) subsets by sending a ciphertext and digest
that do not "match." As before, we rely on heuristics, a small (k+b), and a small corrupt in the
common case to reduce the expected cost of decrypting requests from correct clients. A bad request
from a corrupt client can be detected in a reasonable amount of time if (k+b) is small, and then
subsequent requests from that client can be ignored. We reiterate, however, that we do not expect
the cost of decrypting requests to be a limiting factor in most systems, and so while we are pursuing
additional optimizations to this process (see appendix A), we do not view this as essential.
Assuming that service responses are verified at all clients with a single public key but that
each client that desires Causality has an additional public encryption key for the service, each client
possesses at most two public keys for the service. Each server now possesses one key share per client
desiring Causality, in addition to the key share with which it cooperates to sign responses and the
O(nlog n) bits of public information needed for computing the pi,T'S. (The same pi,T'S can be used
for all instances of the signature scheme and cryptosystem.)
Finally, we note that while this protocol prevents a potentially serious attack arising from
violations of causality, it does not necessarily address all such attacks. A further examination of the
relationship between security and causality is a topic of ongoing research.
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6 Implementation issues
As mentioned in section 1 and discussed further in appendix B, we intend to use the techniques
of sections 4 and 5 in a secure version of the Isis distributed programming toolkit. In this section
we comment on three practical issues that bear on the implementation and use of our protocols.
We do not discuss all relevant issues; several important problems, such as the periodic changing of
keys or the distribution of key shares, have purposely been omitted from discussion because they
are similar to problems encountered in other cryptographic systems and can be solved using known
techniques. Instead, our comments here are restricted to issues that may not be pertinent to most
other cryptographic protocols.
Atomic broadcast
As previously described, our protocols assume the existence of an underlying atomic broadcast pro-
tocol, whose specification is given in section 3. It is well-known, however, that it is impossible to find
a deterministic solution to consensus, and thus atomic broadcast, in an asynchronous system that
can suffer even a single crash failure [10]. While at first this may appear to diminish the usefulness
of our protocols, several systems (e.g., Isis [2] and Amoeba [15]) have successfully circumvented this
impossibility result for all practical purposes.
In the short term, systems such as these appear to be the most promising platforms for imple-
menting our protocols. The idea is that the communication modules of servers would be implemented
using, e.g., the Isis atomic multicast primitives. Because the protocols used by Isis are tolerant of
only benign failures, however, additional precautions would need to be taken to insulate the Isis
protocols from an intruder. In many systems this could be achieved by running Isis as part of the
operating system of each server site and then using secure boot procedures and physical security
to protect the integrity of site operating systems. These measures, when coupled with the security
mechanisms of [22] to defeat network intruders and to prevent unauthorized sites from participat-
ing in the protocols, should make the Isis protocols su_ciently robust for most environments. The
coordination and application modules of servers could then run as application processes, so that
even if some were corrupted or replaced (e.g., because their owners' passwords were guessed) the Isis
protocols would remain intact.
In extremely hostile environments, however, it may be impossible to protect all server sites from
corruption, and thus the above approach may not suffice. In this case, atomic broadcast protocols
tolerant of Byzantine failures (with authentication) are required. Protocols that suffice for various
definitions of honest have already been implemented (e.g., [4]) for synchronous systems, i.e., systems
in which there are known bounds on message transmission times and execution speeds of (correct)
processes. With such a protocol, only the subsystem of servers must be synchronous, because an
atomic broadcast protocol for client requests can be implemented using an atomic broadcast protocol
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for the servers alone, as outlined in section 3. Thus, this approach might be feasible in a situation
where the servers can communicate by a highly reliable and predictable network, but where the clients
are more widely dispersed and unable to communicate with the servers by such predictable means.
Moreover, if the subsystem of servers is synchronous, then our protocols can be improved: e.g., the
protocol of section 5 can easily be modified so that it is live if correct >_.k. There has been little
work on Byzantine atomic broadcast protocols for partially synchronous and asynchronous systems.
However, in a recent private communication, T. D. Chandra described a method to transform any
solution to Byzantine consensus 9 into a solution to Byzantine atomic broadcast.
Public encryption keys
Recall that the protocol of section 5 requires that each client have a different public encryption key
for the service, in order to prevent a corrupt server from mounting chosen ciphertext attacks against
correct cLients' ciphertexts or keys. In general, having separate cryptosystem parameters for each
client may require that each cLient be individually "registered" with the service before using it, so
that the client can obtain a public key for the service and the administrator of the service can provide
to the servers the shares necessary to decrypt this client's requests. While this could limit the settings
in which our protocols can be used, we beLieve that this is not unreasonable if maintaining causality
among cLient requests is a substantial concern.
Nevertheless, in practice it may be possible to relax the requirement that each cLient have its
own pubLic encryption key for the service. For instance, if a group of cLients mutually trust one
another to not participate in chosen ciphertext attacks against one another, then the members of
that group might choose to use the same public encryption key for the service. To illustrate this,
recall the trading service example of section 5. Assuming that a broker will not cooperate in chosen
ciphertext attacks against other brokers in the same firm, all brokers in a single firm could use the
same public encryption key for the service. This would clearly simplify key management: e.g., after
a firm authorized a new broker to issue requests to the service on its behalf, each server could use
its share of the private key corresponding to the public key given to that firm when cooperating to
decrypt a request from that broker. In this way, the addition of a new client (i.e., broker) need not
require the generation of a new pubLic key/private key pair or the secure distribution of new private
key shares to the servers. Another way in which the requirement that each client have its own public
encryption key could be relaxed is described in the following subsection.
Detection of corrupt principals
One resource that we have not fully exploited in our protocols is the ability to detect corrupt prin-
cipals based on messages received from those principals. Such techniques have been used, e.g., in
9Due to [I0], any solution to Byzantine consensus in an asynchronous system must be randomized [3].
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numerousByzantineagreementprotocolsto isolate faulty principals. In practice, methods to detect
and quarantine corrupt principals could be used to deter such principals from mounting attacks and
to improve overM1 system performance.
One example of how a corrupt client can be detected was given in section 5: if a correct server
executes deliver_((c,m)), where m = (m', D), but in step 4 of deliver I there is no set T' of size k
such that digest(A,n,,T,) = D, then c must be corrupt. In particular, the chosen ciphertext attack
illustrated in section 5 would lead to the detection of the corrupt client, because that client could
not compute digest((ym) _ mod N) without knowing (ym) a mod N. This technique, moreover, would
detect any client issuing any ciphertext for which it did not know the corresponding plaintext. If
this threat of detection is believed to be sufficient to deter chosen ciphertext attacks, then all clients
could be allowed to use the same public encryption key for the service.
Our protocols could also benefit from techniques to detect corrupt servers. For instance, in
appendix A we describe several improvements to our protocols that would result from the ability to
detect when a server has provided an incorrect partial result. Other detection techniques and ways
to exploit them are topics of ongoing research and will not be discussed further here.
Summary
While the requirements that an underlying atomic broadcast protocol be available and that each
client use a different public encryption key may seem to reduce the practicality of our protocols,
in many real systems these will not constitute substantial restrictions. We have described several
approaches to implementing atomic broadcast, as well as methods for relaxing the requirement that
each client have its own public encryption key for the service. We believe that, when combined with
techniques to detect and isolate corrupt principals, our protocols can be applied in many types of
systems to achieve efficient, fault-tolerant, and secure service implementations.
7 Related work
This work was largely inspired by [12], which presents a replicated, shared key authentication ser-
vice. The authentication service described there allows two principals to establish a secret, shared
encryption key provided that for some prespecified value k, at least k servers are correct and fewer
than k servers are corrupt. The method discussed in the present work cannot immediately be applied
to construct such a service, because of the additional secrecy requirements. However, our method
can be used to construct an analogous public key authentication service that has the additional
advantage that, unlike the service described in [12], a client need only possess at most two keys for
the service, and not one for each server. ::
Using the state machine approach to construct services tolerant of arbitrary failures with au-
thentication was first considered in [17]. Since then, other authors have focused on secure replication
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of data. Secure data replication using quorum methods is considered in [14] for the case in which
both data integrity and secrecy are important. In these schemes, however, an intruder that corrupts
a client may also be able to compromise the integrity and secrecy of all data. Moreover, clients are
expected to be able to authenticate data repositories. In [20], a space-efficient information disper-
sal algorithm is developed to facilitate the provision of data integrity and availability. The scheme
decomposes a file F into n pieces, each of size lFI/l, such that any l pieces suffice to reconstruct F.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a method for securely replicating services using the state machine approach.
Using our technique, a service can be replicated as n servers in such a way that for some prespecified
parameter k, a client will accept a response computed by a correct server provided that corrupt < k
and correct >_ k. We have also addressed the issue of maintaining causality among client requests.
A security breach resulting from an intruder's ability to violate causality was illustrated, and a safe
and live approach, which requires that corrupt < k and correct >_ k + b, was presented to counter
this problem. An important and novel feature of our methods is that they free the client of the
responsibility of learning the identity and public key of each server. This is achieved by employing two
recent advances in cryptography, namely threshold cryptosystems and threshold signature schemes.
Moreover, we have argued for the feasibility of our techniques through a discussion of several issues
pertinent to their implementation and use.
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A Verifiable threshold cryptography
In this appendix we identify several improvements to our protocols that would result from the
discovery of verifiable threshold signature schemes and cryptosystems. For our purposes, a verifiable
threshold signature scheme or cryptosystem is one with additional properties that would enable
correct and honest servers to efficiently detect whether a server produced its partial result correctly.
We discuss the impact of verifiable schemes on our protocols only in an appendix because to our
knowledge there are no known, practical implementations of such schemes. However, such schemes are
analogous to verifiable (conventional) threshold schemes, which have received substantial attention
in the literature (see, e.g., [21]).
We abstractly capture the verification aspect of verifiable signature schemes and cryptosystems
by postulating a predicate ok such that ok(m,i, ar,,i) is true iff (with a very high probability)
a,_,i is si's correct partial result for m. For instance, in the RSA implementation described in
section 4, ok(m, i, am,i) would be true iff a,n,i =- m K_ mod N. Similarly, when the RSA threshold
cryptosystem is used to decrypt a request m from a client ct as in section 5, ok(m, i, a,,_,i) would be
true iff a,n,i - m h'',_ mod Nt. We assume that ok can be evaluated efficiently (and in polynomial
time) in our system model at all correct and honest servers. Depending on the implementation, this
evaluation may require the servers to be given additional a priori information or to communicate
additional information via existing protocol messages or additional phases of communication. Of
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course,wealso require that this additional informationdoesnot compromisethe securityof the
thresholdsignatureschemeor cryptosystem.
Giventhe predicateok, ourprotocolscanthenbemodifiedasdescribedbelow. In the following
descriptions,rbcast is a reliablebroadcastprimitive providedby servers'communicationmodules
that replacesthe strongerabcastprimitive. (If/¢ is usedto implementD asdescribedin section3,
however,thenabcastmuststill beavailableto the servers.)
RoutinerespondS(c,m) at server si:
1. Execute rbcast(am.i), where am,i - m K' mod N.
2. Wait to receive a set {am,j}j_T, ITI = k, of partial results for m such that for each j E T,
ok(ra, j, am.j) is true.
3. Execute respond(c, (m, Am,T)).
The routine acceptS(m) remains the same.
Routine requestS(m) at client cl:
1. Create the RSA ciphertext m' - me* rood NI of m.
2. Execute request(re').
Routine deliver'((ct,m) )at serversi:
i. Execute rbcast(am,i),where am,i- raK''tmod Nl.
2. Wait to receivea set {areal}jeT,IT[= k, ofpartialresultsform such that foreach j E T,
ok(m,j, am,j) is true.
3. If Am,T is a valid request, then execute deliver((cl, Am,T)).
It was already noted in section 4 that reLiable broadcast could be used to disseminate partial
results in the respond _ routine. So, the key improvement resulting from the use of ok in that routine
is the elimination of the (worst case) exponential search for a correct signature from step 2. Similarly,
the exponential search to find a set of partial results that will properly decrypt a request has been
eliminated from de/iver _. Reliable broadcast can now be used to disseminate partial results in deliver'
because all correct servers will use a set of k correct partial results to decrypt each request, and thus
are no longer required to attempt decryption with the same sets of partial results. Also, clients no
longer need to include message digests in their requests, again because correct servers will always
use k correct partial results to decrypt each request. Finally and most importantly, Claims 5 and 6
can be strengthened respectively to:
Claim 8 If correct > k, then if a correct client issues a request, it will be delivered at all correct
servers. (That is, if correct > k, then the second half of Delivery Validity holds.)
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and
Claim 9 This protocol satisfies the specification of atomic broadcast (for client requests) whenever
correct >_ k.
That is, llveness is guaranteed if correct >_ k. It is not difficult to verify that the other claims of
sections 4 and 5 hold as stated.
Obviously the introduction of verifiable schemes would yield substantial benefits in our protocols.
The investigation of possible verification algorithms is an important direction of ongoing research.
B The Isis security architecture
As mentioned in sections i and 6, the techniques developed in this paper are intended to be used in the
Isis system, which is a toolkit for developing secure, highly reliable distributed applications. In this
appendix, we outline the architecture of a new version of Isis that will incorporate the mechanisms
of this paper, focusing on the Isis security architecture and the degree to which it supports the
assumptions made in this paper.
The Isis project began in 1985 as an effort to develop a collection of tools for building highly
reliable distributed software. Since its inception, the focus of the project has been on supporting
loosely coupled distributed applications that must provide strong consistency guarantees despite
component failures and recoveries. Put simply, Isis is oriented towards applications in which the
actions taken by one system component must be coordinated with the actions taken by other sys-
tem components. To this end, Isis provides to the programmer two basic building blocks: virtually
synchronous process groups and atomic, causally ordered group multicast. Using these mechanisms,
a number of higher-level tools are provided, including mechanisms for managing replicated data,
synchronization, monitoring the status of system components, reconfiguring to recover from failures
or overloads, parallel computation, primary-backup computation, and so forth. A still higher level
of software provides highly reliable services, such as a fault-tolerant network file system, a network
resource manager and load-balancing system, a wide-area messaging system, and a programming
environment for instrumenting distributed applications and developing reliable reactive control sys-
tems. Isis has become widely popular and is currently used by hundreds of academic, commercial
and military researchers and development efforts.
Initially, Isis did not address questions of distributed security. However, starting in 1991, an effort
to reimplement the Isis system from the bottom up was initiated. Introduction of a comprehensive
security architecture has emerged as one of the major thrusts of this activity, along with the adoption
of a micro-kernel design philosophy and greater attention to performance and real time.
Until the present, the basic goal of this security work has been to guarantee the correct behavior
of the Isis system abstractions in the face of various forms of malicious attack. Informally, a system
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is viewedasa setof "islands" of trusted sites surrounded by potentially hostile agents to which the
system provides services, but against which it must protect itself. In [22], we showed the feasibility of
guaranteeing the integrity of the basic Isis services in such an environment, but under the assumption
that within any process group, all member sites would be equally trusted and capable of initiating
actions on behalf of the group as a whole. Thus, the presence of even a single corrupt site within a
process group could lead to arbitrary security violations within that group. Despite the limitations
of this model, we view the Isis security architecture as a significant advance in several respects; in
particular, we believe the new Isis to be among the first systems capable of simultaneously assuring
substantial degrees of both Security and fault-tolerance. Implementation of the security architecture
is now underway, and we expect to have detailed performance figures by early 1993.
It is our intention to implement the methods of the present paper as a security "tool" within this
new version of Isis, in addition to using them to implement key Isis services. Such a tool would offer
a number of practical benefits. First, it would facilitate the implementation of highly fault-tolerant
services that could withstand the corruption of some server processes. Second, due to the feature that
clients need not be able to identify or authenticate individual servers, service administrators could
reconfigure services, possibly even changing the number and identity of servers, without affecting
clients. This feature may also allow non-replicated services in existing systems to be transparently
replaced with secure, replicated service implementations.
The implementation of these techniques in the Isis system does involve tradeoffs, however, be-
cause the system model supported by the Isis security architecture differs in important ways from
that assumed in section 3. The primary difference was already mentioned in section 6, namely that
the atomic broadcast protocol assumed in section 3 is resilient to more hostile failures than the Isis
atomic broadcast protocol. Recall that we suggested one way to compensate for this difference, which
involved protecting the Isis protocols within site operating systems via secure boot procedures and
physical measures. This approach represents a compromise that we view as necessary for practicality
(for the time being) and sufficient for most systems, albeit at a cost to the security of our solutions.
To summarize, our technique for securely replicating services has practical application in the
Isis system, which is now being reimplemented to include a security architecture. This security
architecture goes a long way toward supporting the assumptions enumerated in section 3, and with a
few additional limitations on the failure modes that can be tolerated, will provide a viable platform for
the implementation of the techniques described in this paper. We hope to report on our experience
with the new Isis system, including the implementation of these techniques, within one year to
eighteen months.
26
